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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, I lived and worked among the Winne-
bago Indians. During my time at the reservation, I had the opportunity
to observe and assist in the Tribe's efforts to reclaim a semblance of self-
determination. The main focus of the Tribe's efforts was to obtain civil
and criminal jurisdiction through a process known as retrocession.' The
struggle by the Winnebago to achieve this minimal amount of self-suffi-
ciency is ironic when one considers the Tribe's proud history.
When the Winnebago first made contact with Europeans in the seven-
teenth century, they were one of the most powerful tribes in the northern
t Milo Colton received B.A., M.P.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University
of Colorado and a J.D. degree from the University of Iowa. He served as the executive
director of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska. He also taught college classes at both the
Winnebago and Omaha Indian Reservations. He is currently an attorney and professor
teaching in the Criminal Justice Program at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas.
1. "The act of ceding something back (such as a territory or jurisdiction); the return of
a title or other interest in property back to its former or rightful owner." BLACk's LAw
DICIONARY 1318 (7th ed. 1999).
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woodlands. They occupied a substantial amount of territory, which in-
cluded vast amounts of natural resources, stretching from central Wiscon-
sin to northern Illinois. By the nineteenth century, the Tribe had been
decimated by war and diseases brought by the very Europeans they had
once welcomed. During its dealings with the Europeans, however, the
Winnebago and other Indian tribes were treated as a sovereign govern-
ment and the land which they inhabited was viewed as Indian country.
Ironically, it was the birth of the United States, with its core virtues of
liberty and the right to self-determination, that ended the indigenous peo-
ples'2 ability to govern themselves. The policy of the United States gov-
ernment during the nineteenth century was designed to marginalize and
exploit the American Indians. This was clearly illustrated in two early
United States Supreme Court opinions centering around Indian land
rights.3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall exterminated
Indian rights to land and self-determination. With the stroke of a pen,
Indians were reduced from being free and independent peoples to ex-
isting as domestic dependent nations subject to the federal government.4
Chief Justice Marshall's perception of Indian rights was later solidified by
two coerced treaties that effectively stripped the Winnebago of their ter-
ritory.5 In 1840, the United States forcibly expelled the Winnebago from
their ancestral homeland, beginning an odyssey of five forced removals
through the states of Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Nebraska.
In 1953, the last semblance of Indian self-determination was finally
erased by the passage of Public Law 2806 (PL-280). This federal law ena-
bled the states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribal
reservations.7 Before its passage the tribes had shared jurisdiction with
the federal government, thus maintaining some aspect of autonomy over
their own people. PL-280 eliminated this last remaining aspect of auton-
2. One definition of indigenous people is: the original inhabitants of a territory who,
because of historical circumstances, such as conquest or colonization have lost their sover-
eignty and have become subordinated to the wider society and state control. See Richard
Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIoHrs OF PEOpLES
17-18 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
4. FRANcis PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIEs: THE HIISTORY OF A POLITI-
CAL ANOMALY 196 (1994); see also DAVID AGEE HoRR, AMERICAN INDIAN ETmINOHIs.
TORY: THE WINNEBAGO TRIE 147-157 (1974).
5. Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Sept. 15, 1832, U.S.-Winnebago Nation, 7 Stat. 370;
Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Nov. 1, 1837, U.S.-Winnebago Nation, 7 Stat. 544; see also
PRUCI-IA, supra note 4, at 196.
6. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62,




omy by ending tribal jurisdiction for all crimes.8 Proud tribes like the
Winnebago who once occupied vast areas of land were prevented from
exercising the most rudimentary aspect of self-determination, the exercise
of control over their own people.
Although the passage of PL-280 appeared to be the final act in the play
set in motion by Justice John Marshall's perception of Indian rights, the
civil rights movement in the 1960s gave the Winnebago and other Indian
tribes new hope to reverse the trend of diminishing rights. The civil rights
movement provided the catalyst for expanding the rights of minorities in
the United States, including the rights of American Indians.
In 1968, PL-280 was amended to allow tribes to reclaim their lost civil
and criminal jurisdiction through retrocession. This amendment allows
states to transfer its jurisdictional power back to the indigenous peoples,
thus giving tribes a modicum of self-determination, and limiting their
forced subjugation by state governments.
The Winnebago Tribe was one of the indigenous groups to seize this
opportunity and, after a struggle, to obtain civil and criminal jurisdiction
over its own people. Achieving this goal was the first step toward re-
building their tattered government and infrastructure. It was this struggle
that I witnessed during my time on the reservation. My recent visits to
the reservation revealed a rebirth of a Tribe once unable to perform the
basic function of self-government. 9 Although the Tribe may never obtain
the power and prestige that it had prior to the arrival of the Europeans in
North America, it has recovered some of its lost dignity.
This article focuses on the concept of self-determination as it applies to
indigenous peoples in general and the Winnebago Tribe in particular.
Part II examines the argument that self-determination is a human right to
which indigenous peoples are entitled. Part III provides an overview of
the history of the repression Indigenous peoples have faced as a result of
the European influx into North America and the subsequent problems
that indigenous peoples face in their struggles for autonomy. These
problems include the tension created by the ruling sovereign govern-
ments that have historically repressed, exploited, and sometimes annihi-
lated the American Indian.
In Part IV, the article turns to a case study of the Winnebago Indians'
efforts to achieve a small measure of self-determination within the frame-
8. This had the collateral effect of ending most aspects of tribal governments in favor
of state and county government. See id.
9. The passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) afforded the Winne-
bago additional opportunities to use their rediscovered right of self-determination. See In-




work of the sovereign government of the United States. The long strug-
gle of the Winnebago to reclaim determination of its own destiny
represents a victory for all indigenous peoples and their right to self-
determination.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT
The right of self-determination finds its legal basis in the evolving body
of international human rights law. The expression "human rights" has
only come into everyday usage since the mid-nineteen forties, with the
creation of the United Nations in the aftermath of World War II.10 Es-
sentially, human rights are an extension of "natural rights" or natural
law,1' and focus on legal protection of the individual from the state. The
right of self-determination is a fundamental human right in that it ad-
dresses the threshold question of whether a particular government holds
a legitimate position over a group of people. A brief overview of the
development of human rights law puts the right of self-determination in
context.
In general, human rights are conceptualized in a tripartite manner. 12
First generation rights protect a citizen's liberty from arbitrary state ac-
tion. 3 These first generation rights, which evolved in the aftermath of
the American and French revolutions, were known as negative rights be-
cause of their "restraint from the State" emphasis. 4 Derived from phi-
losophers such as Locke and Rousseau, they are often referred to as civil
and political rights.' 5 Second generation rights, derived out of the con-
cept of socialism, emerged after the Russian Revolution and emphasize
positive State action. 6 While these cultural and political rights do not
enjoy the same breadth of acceptance by nation-states, they nonetheless
are highly incorporated into international law. 17 The most recent devel-
opment in international human rights law, third generation rights, has re-
10. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORI.D COMMUNITY:
IssuEs AND AcroN 13 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 1989).
11. See id. Burns traces the concept of natural law to its modern definition of imply-
ing natural rights. Id. Late in the 17th century, John Locke identified the primary natural
rights as life, liberty, and property. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATIES ON GOVERNMENT (P.
Laslett ed., 1963).
12. See D. J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 625 (5th ed.
1998); Weston, supra note 10, at 16.
13. Roland Rich, The Right to Development A Right of Peoples?, in RIGHTS OF PEo.
PLES 41 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
14. Id. at 41. Negative rights corresponded by and large to the Civil and Political
rights in the International Bill of Rights.
15. See HARus, supra note 12, at 625.
16. Rich, supra note 13, at 41.
17. See HARMs, supra note 12, at 625.
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suited from the encroaching phenomenon of global interdependence, and
is mainly advanced by developing countries. In essence, third generation
rights speak to the rights of groups in relation to the state and the inter-
national community, as opposed to the first two generations of human
rights which address the individual.'" The right to self-determination and
economic development are examples of this genre.19 The human right of
development is connected to the right of self-determination of peoples; in
order to achieve development, a people must have the ability to address
their own distinct needs.
The concept of self-determination began to gain international momen-
tum after the development of the post-colonialist nation-state. In the af-
termath of World War I, United States President Woodrow Wilson
articulated the importance of the protection of a people's right to self-
determination.20 Wilson's early concept of self-determination had three
prongs: People have the right "to be free from alien rule;" people should
have the right "to select their own form of government;" and there should
be continuous consent to be governed. 1 His proposal subsequently be-
came the basis for the United Nations' stance and legal understanding of
the self-determination of peoples.
Article 1(2) of the United Nations' Charter' unquestionably the most
significant international agreement in all of international law, addresses a
peoples' right to self-determination z and, in fact, is the only human right
specifically mentioned in the entire Charter. Additionally, Article 55 on
18. See id.
19. See id. at 626.
20. See John Paxman, Minority Indigenous Populations and Their Claims for Self-De-
termination, 21 CASE W. REs. 3. INT'L L. 185, 193-94 (1989). Wilson's vision included the
formation of a league of nations whose mission included the protection of the people's
right to self-determination. See id. Notably, the desire for self-determination had an ex-
traordinary impact on an international level. For example, the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist set off a chain of events that incited the start to
World War I. See id. The assassin belonged to a nationalist group that believed the Ser-
bian people should be recognized as their own people separate and apart from the Otto-
man Empire. See i. Post WWI world leaders attempted to create a League of Nations to
address the concerns of disenfranchised groups. See id. While the League of Nations ulti-
mately failed, its successor the United Nations, which was created in 1945, established an
opportunity to deal with the concerns of those groups seeking self-determination.
21. Id. at 193.
22. Currently the United Nations Charter has been ratified by 189 countries. See
United Nations, List of Member States, at http.www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2002).
23. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Article 1(2) states:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of
equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace.
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International and Economic Social Cooperation reiterates the impor-
tance of creating conditions through which the self-determination of peo-
ples can be preserved. 4 This right of self-determination was expanded
upon in two 1966 United Nations Covenants.' Both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 6 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 7 establish that the right of self-
determination is a prerequisite for people to "freely determine their po-
litical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment."2 However, the ability for any group of people to claim a right
to self-determination is not unfettered. In particular, United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1514 paragraph 6 states:
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 9
Id. (emphasis added); see also LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER O' THI UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 25 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
24. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ples of equal rights and self-determinations of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; an inter-
national cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Id. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 23, at 371.
25. See International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 6; International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
26. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, para. 1.
27. International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, para.
1.
28. Articles 1(1) of both covenants read:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, para. 1; Interna-
tional Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, para. 1.
29. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 1 6, U.N. Doe. A/14684
(1960). See also G.A. Res. 1514, supra 1 7. Ironically, in the same breath, the General
Assembly resolution requires that States adhered to the provisions of the United Nations'
Charter. Id. Paragraph 7 states:
All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declara-
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AMERICAN INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
This clarifying Resolution exemplifies one of the earliest tensions in
international human rights law-the conflict between preserving the ter-
ritorial sovereignty rights of governments and the self-determinative
human rights of peoples.30 Historically, the international community has
favored the position of nation-states over the peoples living within their
borders, and while the body of international human rights law has gar-
nered much more authority in recent history, the State still maintains a
superior position.31 Consequently, the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion must be reconciled with the right of governments to rule those who
live within their territory.32
International law began as the law amongst nation-states, not people.
This is reflected through the United Nations Charter's positive duties im-
posed on nations, most notably to promote international peace and secur-
ity.33 Though the Charter promotes the rights of people vis a vis the
state, this affirmation is outweighed by the Charter's embracement of na-
tional sovereignty and external non-intervention or interference with any
states' administration of its peoples.3 Unfortunately, this position leads
to the subrogation of indigenous peoples' right to self-determination.35
tion on the basis of equality, non interference in the internal affairs of all States, and
respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
Id.
30. IL See Falk, supra note 2, at 25-26 (explaining how tensions between territorial
sovereignty and individual human rights is most often resolved in favor of the state); Ves-
ton, supra note 10, at 21.
31. See Falk, supra note 2, at 17; see also Rebecca L Robbins, Self-Determination and
Subordination: The Pas4 Present, and Future of American Indian Governance, in THE
STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENocIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 87,90,92 (M.
Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) (stating the Native American Indian nations' rights to self-gov-
ernment are usurped by the foreign power of the United States).
32. See Falk, supra note 2, at 25-26; Glenn T. Morris, International Last, and Politics:
Toward a Right to Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, in THn STATE OF NATIVE
AiErucA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATON, AND REsIsrANcE 55, 67, 92 (M. Annette Jaimes
ed., 1992)
33. See Falk, supra note 2, at 26. Paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter states:
All states uphold the obligation to enforce the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and this Declaration on the basis of equality,
non-interference in the internal affairs of all states and respect for the sovereign rights
of all peoples and their territorial sovereignty.
U.N. CHARTER para. 7. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (listing the purposes of the U.N.);
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 73, 76 (describing the application of the U.N. Charter to the self-
determination of Peoples).
34. See Falk, supra note 2, at 26; GooDmci ETr AL., supra note 23, at 30.
35. See James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: 'Peoples' or 'Governments'?, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 55,55-56 (James Crawford ed., 1988); Falk, supra note 2, at 26 (stating,
in this context, self-determination is subordinated to the more important integrity of the
state); Robbins, supra note 31, at 90.
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Total deference to state sovereignty and non-intervention is problematic
when "the State" is controlled solely by a fragment of the people who
reside within its borders. 36 Consequently, that unrepresentative popula-
tion becomes, by virtue of the assumptions inherent in the U.N. Charter,
understood to be the totality of the peoples within the state.37 It then
follows that unrepresented members of "the population" are not only
without a "State," but have little recourse because they do not fit the
matrix of international law, which places a premium on statehood, not
peoplehood.38
Native Americans provide an example of a people who lived in terri-
tory later claimed by a new State, and were not included in either that
new State's power apparatus, or, according to the United Nations' Char-
ter, in the definition of a separate independent State.39 To truly under-
stand the socio-political plight of Native Americans, it is important to
know what constitutes a "people," to define "peoplehood," and to ex-
amine these concepts in relation to statehood.
A. The Concept of Peoplehood
In analyzing the language in the various United Nations' instruments
which assert that "[all] people have the right of self-determination,"40 it is
necessary to clearly define who holds this right. 41 In the present lexicon
of international thought, there are two competing notions of "pe-
oplehood"-that of all people within a nation-state's sovereignty, and an
alternative, more general concept not derived from nationality, but rather
36. See Falk, supra note 2, at 26; see also JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED DY THE PEO-
PLE:" A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 159-160 (1994) (ad-
ding that the Indians regarded self-determination as "legal and political sovereignty").
37. See Crawford, supra note 35, at 55-56; Falk, supra note 2, at 26.
38. See Crawford, supra note 35, at 55-56; Falk, supra note 2, at 17,26; David Makin-
son, Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a Logician, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 69, 74-75
(James Crawford ed., 1988). See generally U.N. CHARTER.
39. Cf Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in IN.
DIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND AccouNTs OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN, 191,204-05 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986) (noting the State entity
has consistently failed to protect Indian interests); Falk, supra note 2, at 26.
40. Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination and the Middle East Conflict, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 159, 160 (Richard Pierre
Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989); Robert McCorquodale, The Right of Self-Detertni-
nation, in THm INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RiG-rs AND UNITED
KINGDOM LAW 91, 91 (David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds., 1995).
41. Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161; McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 96 (noting Arti-
cle 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not define who can
exercise such rights as "peoples"); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 59 (1995).
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membership in a particular race, ethnicity, or religion.42 The first charac-
terization of a people seemingly collapses the notion of statehood and
peoplehood; it states that all people within a nation are "a people," thus
making peoplehood and statehood almost interchangeable. The second
definition distinguishes a "nation" from a "people" by holding that a na-
tion "consists of the entire citizen body of a state" and within that "nation
there can exist several peoples, large and small."43 This definition holds
that a particular group within a nation's citizenry can claim to possess
"peoplehood" based on both objective and subjective criteria.44
The objective criteria of peoplehood requires a group to have a com-
mon identity based on history.45 Other objective aspects of peoplehood
include, but are not limited to common territory, religion, or language.46
Variations in religion or language as the result of migration can be toler-
ated if the group has maintained its ethnic identity over space and time.4 7
In fact, the bonds of common suffering are often a characteristic of
peoplehood.4'
The subjective standard that must also be met expands upon the objec-
tive historical standard. Namely, the group must presently maintain a
specific ethnic identification.49 This present ethos may manifest itself as a
commitment by the group to live together and continue practicing their
common traditions.50 Together, these two criteria of a shared history and
present participation in a culture based on that history play an important
role when considering the impact of statehood on peoples who are not
part of the dominant culture. Specifically, the tension between pe-
oplehood and statehood plays out in the context of human rights protec-
tions of minority groups from the government or international law.
42. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW
WE USE IT 124 (1994).
43. Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161; McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 97 (noting that
the definition of "peoples" is not limited to all inhabitants of one state as a single group).
44. Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161. Dinstein recognizes, however, that there is "no
acid technical test which would enable us to determine whether a cluster of human beings
constitutes a people." Id See also McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 97 (listing objective
conditions suggested and acknowledging the subjective aspect of a group's conscious need
to identify itself as a "people").
45. See Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161; McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 97.
46. See Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161; McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 97.
47. See Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161.
48. See id.
49. See iUL See generally McCorquodale, supra note 40, at 97 (stating the need for
ethnic identification has been recognized).
50. See Dinstein, supra note 40, at 161.
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B. The States' Impact on Indigenous Human Rights
Historically, state policy has victimized the indigenous population, 51
and because of their shared grievances of state encroachment, many in-
digenous groups have come together to share a collective identity.52 This
situation creates a competing nationalism within the State's boundaries. 3
As a consequence, indigenous peoples have challenged governmental no-
tions of territorial sovereignty and jurisdictional institution. 4 Indigenous
peoples assert their own sovereign right and a nationality based on his-
tory, tradition, and self-determination. Such assertions have lead to con-
flicts over claims to lands, refusal to pay taxes, refusal to serve in the
military, and repudiation of the states' educational programs. 55 Accord-
ing to the coalition of indigenous persons, these programs promote the
dominant culture and society, while effectively diminishing and destroy-
ing the culture and lifestyles of indigenous peoples.56
Since indigenous peoples have been systematically exploited and vic-
timized by the state governments in which they are entrapped, there has
been effort in recent years to redress their claims in the international
arena through human rights law.57 Unfortunately, state systems such as
the United Nations and its International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) exert
considerable control over international systems by restricting member-
ship and participation.5" The I.C.J., for example, may only hear cases
51. See Falk, supra note 2, at 18; see also Robbins, supra note 31, at 87, 90 (describing
the plenary power asserted by the United States).
52. See Falk, supra note 2, at 18 (stating the collective identity represents a competi-
tive nationalism within the state); see also Deloria, supra note 39, at 198.
53. See Eugene Kamenka, Human Rights: Peoples' Rights, in THE Riirs OF PEOPLES
127, 131 (James Crawford ed., 1988). Nationalism has several definitions; however, for the
purposes of this article, nationalism is connected with the need to define and unify the new
sovereign. See id. See also Garth Nettheim, "Peoples" and "Populations" - Indigenous
Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in TiE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 107, 117-18 (James Crawford
ed., 1988). Nettheim explains the merits of arguing self-determination instead of sover-
eignty. Id. Sovereignty refers to the independent nation state in international law. See id.
at 117.
54. See Falk, supra note 2, at 18; see also Nettheim, supra note 53, at 112-13 (stating
the claims advanced in Canada have a strong basis in treaty and judicial recognition).
55. See Falk, supra note 2, at 18 (stating that the practical result of such conflicts is
resistance on the part of indigenous peoples primarily due to the state's victimization of
indigenous peoples).
56. See id. at 20 (claiming progressive approaches tend to result in more pressure on
state systems).
57. See id. at 18-21. The growth of modem communications and transportation has
internationalized the struggle of indigenous peoples in the last decade. Id. at 19.
58. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 3-4; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, U.S.T.S. 933, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 34, para. 1; Falk, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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involving its members, and membership is restricted to nation-states.5 9
Furthermore, states must consent to the Court's jurisdiction.' Conse-
quently, indigenous peoples cannot realistically expect resolution of their
claims in the I.C.J., or other regional international governmental organi-
zations with similar arrangements, namely the Organization of American
States.6
1
Options do exist for addressing the human rights of indigenous people
outside of the international judicial system. These options include pro-
moting the creation of national regimes which embrace both the individ-
ual and group rights of indigenous peoples, international non-
governmental agencies applying pressure on nation-states, and a specific
examination of the role indigenous peoples play as formal international
actors.
62
First, sovereign governmental notions of territorial sovereignty and na-
tionalism provide a framework in which to address and advance the
human rights of indigenous peoples.63 The rights of peoples provide per-
spective and support for a non-statist approach by challenging the compe-
tence of an inter-governmental system. Challenging the State's power
apparatus within the system has been an effective tool for indigenous
peoples, and has resulted in numerous gains such as jurisdictional
retrocession.
Second, the establishment of non-governmental forums to address
human rights, including but not limited to non-governmental organiza-
tions, provides an alternative option for preserving the rights of indige-
nous people.6 Such independent access to the international legal system
not only checks the State's power, but also treats the law as an instrument
of the people, and not entirely of the government.6" An example of such
59. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, U.S.T.S. 933, 59
Stat. 1031, art. 4, para. 1-3, art. 34, para. 1; Falk, supra note 2, at 19.
60. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, U.S.T.S. 933, 59
Stat. 1031, art. 36, para. 1-5; Falk, supra note 2, at 19.
61. See Falk, supra note 2, at 19-20. The statist nature of such regional organizations
impedes resolution of indigenous people's claims by the very structure of the claiming pro-
cess, in which states exert dominant control. See id. See also Morris, supra note 32, at 73-
77 (discussing whether the U.N.'s right to self-determination applies to indigenous
peoples).
62. See Wunder, supra note 36, at 8. The rights of the individual in an indigenous
group are those predictable rules reached and enforced by the Tribe. Id. Group rights are
those rights given to ensure the tribe's survival and those that are best for the group as a
whole. Id. See generally Falk, supra note 2, at 24-36 (noting the three uses of the term
"rights of peoples" must be distinguished from one another).
63. See Falk, supra note 2, at 18; see also U.N. CHmRrteR; Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, U.S.T.S. 933, 59 Stat. 1031.
64. See Falk, supra note 2, at 27.
65. See id. at 29.
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a forum is the Permanent People's Tribunal.66 The tribunal consists of
private citizens of high moral authority, including Nobel Prize winners
and well-known cultural, legal, and religious leaders.6 7 The Tribunal at-
tempts to address concerns of global society. For example, the Tribunal
has heard arguments on allegations of genocide of the Armenian people
by Turkey, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the use of Indonesian
force in East Timor, American intervention in Central America, and the
repression of human rights in the Philippines by former President Ferdi-
nand Marcos.68 In several instances, the Tribunal presented legal docu-
mentation of injustices experienced by victims, thereby performing the
valuable function of educating the international community and high-
lighting certain regimes violations of international human iights law. 69
A third option addressing human rights is manifested by a movement
to develop a set of initiatives targeting the needs of indigenous peoples. 70
This movement acknowledges the impact of past experiences, the insuffi-
ciency of existing international laws and procedures, and establishes orga-
nizations for determining and protecting the human rights of indigenous
peoples. 7 Furthermore, this movement readily admits that the present
international legal framework neither provides indigenous peoples with
access to the main political arenas, nor appreciates their specific historic
identity, their special claims, and their special value to society as a
whole.72
66. See id. at 28-29, 29 n.17. Created in the late 1970s, the Permanent People's Tribu-
nal has examined previously untreated grievances or problems which have been insuffi-
ciently addressed. See id. See also PERMANENT PEOPLES' TRIBUNAL, A CRIME OF
SILENCE, THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE: PERMANENT PEoPLEs' TRIBUNAL (Gerard
Libaridian, ed., Zed Books Ltd., 1985).
67. See Falk, supra note 2, at 28.
68. In making its decisions, the Tribunal heard witnesses, invited the defendant gov-
ernments to participate, and issued a judgment based on the evidence presented in each
proceeding. See id. The Permanent People's Tribunal held that the Armenian and East
Timor populations had a protected right, and the resulting extermination was a crime of
genocide. In addition, the Tribunal found that the International Law and rights of the
Afghanistan people were violated by the Soviet Union. See Lelio Basso International
Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, at http://www.grisn-t.it/filb/filbeng.
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
69. See Falk, supra note 2, at 28. Other ad hoc tribunals have considered the legality
of: the nuclear arms race in 1982 and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1983. See id, at 29;
see also Lelio Basso International Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples,
supra note 68.
70. See Falk, supra note 2, at 31 (stating that both individual and group rights would
be applicable). See generally Deloria, supra note 39, at 191-207 (outlining policies and
initiatives that address the human rights of Indians).
71. See Falk, supra note 2, at 31.
72. See id. See generally Joe De La Cruz et al., What Indians Should Want: Advice to
the President, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RE3LA.
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This third option has been described as a "qualitative extension of
human rights and self-determination."'73 This strategy to protect human
rights for indigenous people exists for several reasons, and public policy
rather than logic dictates its necessity.74 International conventions per-
taining to the rights of women, Apartheid, and genocide have been for-
mulated under this mantra of public policy." Individuals from
humanity's most vulnerable sectors, victimized and oppressed by current
policies and arrangements, seek the protective measures offered by the
creation of distinctive categories of human rights.76 When ignorance and
misunderstanding fuel this abuse, the claim for protection is more pro-
nounced. Such is the case of indigenous peoples. Historically, indigenous
peoples have been excluded from all decision making processes as the
"alien assumptions and institutional arrangements" of the dominant soci-
ety assess claims on their behalf.' Nonetheless, a political and moral
climate currently exists to support a regime advocating the claims of in-
digenous peoples. Without separate treatment and full participation in
the deliberations and considerations of their problems and claims, they
cannot be understood.78
Historically, the effects of international institutions creating a special
category of human rights for indigenous peoples, or for taking into ac-
count the adverse circumstances of indigenous peoples, are "woefully in-
adequate."7 9 The International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
107, adopted in 1957,80 remains the only specific intergovernmental docu-
MONS FROm ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 311 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986) (discussing difficul-
ties that Indians still face).
73. Falk, supra note 2, at 31.
74. See iL at 32.
75. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1993, 193 U.N.T.S. 135;
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Mar. 1,
1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (providing for the rights of all
women); Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Nov.
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (condemning apartheid as a crime against humanity); Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948,78 U.N.T.S.
277 (labeling genocide as a crime under international law).




80. International Labor Organization Convention (No. 107), The Protection and Inte-
gration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Coun-
tries, in INTERNA-IONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATMONS, 1919-1981 858
(1982). See Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L. & Pot.'v
689, 731 (1994) (claiming Convention 107, adopted in 1957 and 1989, both recognize the
right of ownership and possession applicable only to indigenous and tribal peoples); see
also Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art.
2001]
THE SCHOLAR
ment in the human rights context that specifically addresses the discrimi-
nation and exploitation of indigenous peoples.81 Unfortunately, ILO
Convention 107 is predicated upon the paternalistic notion that assimila-
tion into the dominant society by indigenous peoples should be the ulti-
mate objective.82
However, ILO Convention 107 contains some beneficial elements. For
example, it recognizes growing international concern that abusive prac-
tices towards indigenous peoples are widespread throughout the world.83
Further, the Convention asserts that indigenous peoples are entitled to
non-discriminatory treatment and equality of treatment in their dealings
and relations with mainstream society.'
A third justification prescribes the formulation of a coherent legal re-
gime due to the beneficial aspects of raising political and social conscious-
ness.8" In doing so, governments, other institutions, and indigenous
peoples themselves better appreciate the problems and politics of their
time.86 It would be ideal if indigenous peoples had a central function in
defining their own framework of rights as particular societal circum-
stances dictate present laws.87
In sum, when considering self-determination for indigenous peoples,
the discussion should be placed in a world context rather than a State
context.88 The struggle by indigenous people for self-determination
could reduce control of the central government and even threaten cohe-
siveness within a State. The reality of this struggle leads to a sobering
14(1), 16(1) (1989), reprinted in BASIC DocuMENTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS 303 (Ian Browlie
ed., 1992).
81. See Falk, supra note 2, at 32; Stavropoulou, supra note 80, at 731.
82. See Falk, supra note 2, at 32-33; see also Roxanne Dubar Ortiz, Protection of
American Indian Territories in the United States: Applicability of International Law, in IR.
REDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 253 (Imre Sutton ed.,
1985) (noting that this treaty was not ratified by the United States when it was adopted in
1957).
83. See Falk, supra note 2, at 33; see also CASSESE, supra note 41, at 329 (finding ILO
Convention 107 is the only treaty that protects indigenous populations).
84. See Falk, supra note 2, at 32. The author notes equality and non-discrimination
should be granted to those who are victimized, because they are unable to assimilate into
the dominant society. See id.
85. See id. at 33.
86. The efforts of preparation in such a process compels all parties involved - those
that represent governments or other institutions, and indigenous peoples themselves - to
better appreciate such problems and policies. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 34 (also claiming the rights of indigenous peoples and the relationship
between communities must be considered).
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conclusion: within a statist framework, a legal regime characterized as
anti-statist will most likely never be endorsed. 9
Besides a heavy bias within international law for sovereign regimes, the
lack of consensus among indigenous peoples in many areas serves as an
obstacle to achieving self-determination as well." This disparity exists
when conflicts of particular groups of indigenous peoples overlap, as with
their claims to individual rights and antecedent lands. Indigenous peoples
also differ in assessing strategies for their continuing existence.91 Survival
is viewed as either merely seeking to preserve and augment their current
status or as a radical and complete restoration of traditional rights.' No-
tably, there are differences in leadership styles among indigenous peo-
ples.93 The American Indians of the United States present one example
of a group of indigenous people striving to achieve a semblance of self-
determination within the established state system. As with all indigenous
groups, whatever governmental philosophy is ultimately chosen, special
care must be taken to fully address the social, political, and legal issues
facing the modern indigenous peoples of America.94
III. HIsTORiCAL BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF THE REPRESSION
OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN
In the early history of the United States, the Supreme Court, led by the
Chief Justice John Marshall, established a precedent through two opin-
ions95 that served as the impetus behind the government's subsequent
detrimental policies dealing with Native Americans.





93. See hI. Leaders range from assimilationists to separatists. Id. Assmilationist lead-
ers may choose accommodation because of stakes with the dominant culture. Id. Separatist
leaders may choose radical encounters to show support for indigenous peoples. Id.
94. See id at 34-35. One recommendation involves implementing a regime that in-
cludes autonomy through the reconciliation of conflicting interests, territorial clarification,
and gathering dispersed peoples; building networks of solidarity with other groups on both
an international and transnational scale; protection against exploitation through the pro-
motion of human rights; international recognition of indigenous peoples that allows claims
and grievances to be brought in arenas alternative to national legal systems; restoration of
Native American holy lands to sustain the integrity of religion and culture; and restitution
for those Indian tribes in danger of extinction. Id.
95. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
96. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
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But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to
leave a wilderness ....
These words reveal the predominant attitude at the time towards indige-
nous peoples in the United States. The opinion in Johnson dedicates it-
self to the rationalization of the appropriation of Indian land by the
United States government. Ironically, Marshall's own use of the words
"their country,"98 indicates a full admission that the country and thus the
land, belonged to the Indians. Yet, regardless of his understanding of the
Indians' property rights, Marshall and the Court denied the true standing
of Indian land and determined that the United States held ultimate title. 9 9
In effect, Marshall's words in Johnson are testimony to the fact that the
Supreme Court enabled the government to solidify its acquisition of
wrongful title. 00
In the second opinion, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,10' Marshall further
diminished the importance of free, independent Indian nations by refer-
ring to them as dependants and comparing the relationship between the
United States and the Indian nations to "that of a ward to his guard-
ian."' 02 These two opinions reveal the paradigm through which the fed-
eral government viewed American Indians and their property rights, or
rather, their lack thereof. American Indians were designated to a juve-
nile, dependent status-their rights "necessarily" lessened by their conve-
nient classifications.10 3
These opinions enshrined the basic foundation for the United States'
discriminatory policy towards Native Americans, and negatively impacted
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 592. Marshall actually states that, "[i]t has never been contended, that the
Indian title amounted to nothing. Their rights of possession has [sic] never been ques-
tioned." Id. at 603. And this same opinion is supported by the argument that "[dJiscovery
is the foundation of title, in European nations, and this overlooks all proprietary rights in
the natives." Id. at 567. It is these kinds of disparities that allow characterization of the
opinion as one based on spurious logic. The latter quote also begs the observation that
Indians must inherently have "discovered" the land before any of their European conquer-
ors because they were already living on it.
100. Id. at 590. Marshall provided two rationales for this decision. Id. First he gave
exclusive title of land to those nations who "discovered" it. Id. The second rule labeled
"Indian inhabitants" as "occupants" no matter how long they might have lived on the land.
Id. Marshall concluded by stating that "discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest." Id.
101. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).




all indigenous peoples. The Winnebago Tribe represents just one exam-
ple of the loss that Native Americans suffered as a result of the United
States' guardianship. In the 1830s, the United States implemented Mar-
shall's vision by systematically stripping the Winnebago of their territory
through two coerced treaties."° Subsequently, in 1840, the United States
forcibly expelled the Tribe from its ancestral homeland, in Wisconsin, be-ginning an odyssey of five forced removals from the states of Iowa, Min-
nesota, South Dakota, and Nebraska."'
IV. WINNEBAGO SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The People
The Winnebago Indians have a long history as a separate and distinct
people. Winnebago traditions assert that the Tribe originated in the
Green Bay, Wisconsin area.106 It is believed that the Winnebago re-
present the second wave of Siouan migrations westward, from a possible
homeland somewhere in the Appalachian Mountains. 1 7 Ethnologists de-
scribe four migrations: first the influx of the Mandan, Hidatsa, Crow;
second came the Iowa, Oto, Missouri, Winnebago; third included the
Omaha, Ponca, Osage, Kansa, Quapaw; and the fourth consisted of the
Dakota and Assiniboin.10 8 OfK this basis, the assertion is made that the
Winnebago are closely related to the Missouri, Oto and Iowa tribes.1 9
Moreover, the Hidatsa and Crow of the first migration speak dialects
closely related to the Dakota and Assiniboin of the fourth migration.110
The Mandan, however, are closely related linguistically to the Winnebago
and others of the second migration as opposed to the Hidatsa."1
A number of Winnebago recollections of their separation from their
kindred tribes have been recorded." 2 According to one account:
When the Winnebago lived on Lake Michigan the tribe was so large
that each clan had its own chief and a general chief presided over the
104. Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Nov. 1, 1837, U.S.-Winnebago Nation, 7 Stat. 544;
Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Sept. 15, 1832, U.S.-Winnebago Nation, 7 Stat. 370; see also
PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 196.
105. PAUL RADiN, THE WNEBAGO TRiBE 2, 28-29, 32 (Bison Books 1990) (1923)
(describing the difficulty in determining exactly when the Winnebago entered the Wiscon-
sin area, and revealing the evidence that does exist is largely anecdotal).
106. Id. at 1-2 (describing the four successive Siouan migrations westward that may
have explained the Winnebago migration from the east).
107. Id.







whole tribe. After a while it became so hard to obtain food that a
band of Winnebago went south. They never returned. Band after
band kept moving away until only one was left-the present
Winnebago." 3
The other tribes of the second migration, the Iowa, Oto, and Missouri,
have recorded their recollections of the Winnebago as well. 14 An Oto
chief once stated that the Winnebago originally inhabited the area of the
Great Lakes and subsequently migrated southwest in pursuit of buf-
falo. 1 5 Originally, the Winnebago remained at Green Bay, while the
other tribes journeyed southwest." 6 This began their separation from
other kindred tribes as the Winnebago nation once included the Missouri,
Omaha, Oto, and Ponca tribes." 7 Initially, the tribes moved together
from a home to the north of Great Lakes, but the Winnebago stayed near
Lake Michigan because of its abundant fish."'
By the time the French encountered the Winnebago in 1634, the Cen-
tral Algonquin tribes had already moved into the surrounding area. 119
Situated to the north on the Green Bay shore were the Menominee; the
Miami occupied the southeast; the Sauk and Fox were located toward the
south and southwest; and the west was inhabited by the Ojibwa. 120 The
nearest kindred to the Winnebago lived in eastern Minnesota, western
Wisconsin, and southern Iowa. 2' Ethnologists believe the Winnebago
became isolated from their Siouan relatives no earlier than the sixteenth
century. 22 With the isolation, the Winnebago began to adopt Algon-
113. Id. Another account maintains that when the other tribes organized against the
Winnebago, four Winnebago lodges, fearing the outbreak of war, moved from Prairie Du
Chien, or present-day MacGregor, Wisconsin, never to be seen again. These lodges are
believed to have resurfaced as the Oto tribe, which speaks a similar language that includes
many Winnebago words which are no longer in use. See id. at 3.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 4; J.A. Jones, An Anthropological Report on the Indian Occupancy of
Royce Areas 149, 174 and 245, in WNNEBAGO INDIANS 25, 21 (David Agee Horr ed.,
1974).
116. RADIN, supra note 105, at 4; Jones, supra note 115, at 21.
117. RADIN, supra note 105, at 4 (according to the recollections of several Iowa
chiefs). See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 21 (observing that those four tribes share
similar dialects and customs).
118. RADIN, supra note 105, at 4; see Jones, supra note 115, at 21.
119. RADiN, supra note 105, at 4; Jones, supra note 115, at 21.
120. RADIN, supra note 105, at 4; Jones supra note 115, at 21.




quian traits. For example, the name Winnebago is of Algonquian ori-
gin.'- The Winnebago call themselves Hotcangara.24
However, the Winnebago also gained the enmity of their Algonquian-
speaking neighbors as they fought over control of natural resources." s
The Algonquins waged a relentless war against the Winnebago, eventu-
ally leading to their destruction."z
In 1634, the Frenchman Jean Nicolet, an agent for Governor Cham-
plain of New France became the first European to visit the Winnebago.1 7
He found them to be prosperous and numerous." Over a period of
time, and as a consequence of a succession of wars with their Algonquian
neighbors, the Winnebago population began to decline.12 9 Then came "a
disease that turned their bodies yellow and many died of this sickness."13
This influx of disease resulted in the decimation of the population.
The growing French presence in Winnebago country added a new di-
mension to the intertribal strife that had pre-dated white incursion into
the Green Bay area.-3' For example, in 1728, the French, fearing a possi-
ble Fox, Iroquois, and Sioux alliance against them, set out to crush the
Fox with 450 French soldiers and 1,200 Indian allies.132 This venture
failed, but a Winnebago village located on Lake Winnebago was de-
stroyed as a result of the collateral damage of war waged by fellow Indi-
ans acting in concert with the French. 3
123. See Lee Sultzman, Winnebago History, at http:/www.dickshovel.com/Vin.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with author) (noting that while rebuilding their popula-
tion the Winnebago adopted many Algonquian traits).
124. See id. (stating this name means "people of the parent speech"); see also RArnN,
supra note 105, at 5 (explaining the name has also been interpreted to mean "big fish
people").
125. See Jones supra note 115, at 49. The Kickapoo, the Menominee, the Sac, the
Chippewa, the Fox, the Mascouten, the Illinois, and the Potawatomi were at one period or
another Algonquian-speaking neighbors of the Winnebago. See id. at 41.
126. See RADiN, supra note 115, at 5-6; Jones, supra note 115, at 49-50; see also
Sultzman, supra note 123 (describing resulting wars leading almost to the extinction of the
Winnebago).
127. RADn, supra note 105, at 5; see Sultzman, supra note 123 (noting that only 500 of
the Wmnebago remained from the numbers described by Nicolet); see also Jones, supra
note 115, at 41.
128. RADiN, supra note 105, at 7.
129. Id. at 6. See also Jones, supra note 115, at 50-52 (providing an account on how
the Winnebago betrayal to the Illinois led to their downfall).
130. RADIN, supra note 105, at 9-10.
131. Jones, supra note 115, at 66. See generally Sultzman, supra note 123 (describing a
series of battles and conflicts involving the French).




In this new environment, it was not uncommon for alliances to shift,
enemies to join each other, and partners to fight. 134 This is demonstrated
by the partial Winnebago participation, later that same year, in a French,
Ottawa, and Menominee attack on a Fox village. 35 Eventually this fluid-
ity of alliance led to Indian involvement in the conflicting interests of
European powers in North America. 36
In 1752, the French, fearing a British plan to use the Illinois Indians
against them, sought Indian assistance of their own.' 3 7 A war party of
Winnebago, Sac, Fox; Potowatomie, and Menominee were incited by the
French to attack the Illinois, thus disrupting the British plan.138 Shortly
thereafter, open warfare between the British and French broke out over
control of the Ohio Valley,' 3 9 and in September 1759, the English cap-
tured Quebec, thereby breaking French power in the region.' In 1763,
the French signed the Treaty of Paris, officially relinquishing control of
Canada. 4 '
Throughout this British-French struggle, the Winnebago remained al-
lied with the French.' 42 After the French defeat and their subsequent
expulsion from North America, the Winnebago region fell under British
influence.' 43 Eventually the American Revolutionary War brought the
British to the Winnebago in search of allies to fight against the American
colonial rebels." The Winnebago, as well as other Western tribes lent
their help. 45
134. See id. at 67.
135. See id.; Sultzman, supra note 123.
136. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 36-69; Sultzman, supra note 123 (outlining
Indian alliances with the French and British, to include participation in the Revolutionary
war).
137. See Jones, supra note 115, at 43.
138. See RADIN, supra note 105, at 42-43; Sultzman, supra note 123.
139. See FRED A. ANDERSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRMSH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at xxi (2000) (noting
the French and the British went to war over control of the Ohio Valley); Sultzman, supra
note 123.
140. See ANDERSON, supra note 139, at 365; Sultzman, supra note 123.
141. See ANDERSON, supra note 139, at 505; see also CALDER, REVOLUTIONARY EM.
PIRE: THE RISE OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING EMPIRES FROM THE 15TH CENTURY TO TiE
1780s, at 412 (Pimlico 1998) (1981); Sultzman, supra note 123.
142. Jones, supra note 115, at 43-44. See generally Sultzman, supra note 123 (outlining
French and British alliances over the years).
143. See Jones, supra note 115, at 73; Sultzman, supra note 123.
144. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 84-99 (discussing the recruitment of West-
ern Indians, including the Winnebago, by the British during the Revolutionary War);
Sultzman, supra note 123.
145. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 84-99; Sultzman, supra note 123.
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Ultimately, the Colonists prevailed and in the early 1800s the Winne-
bago joined Tecumseh and other tribes to oppose the white people pour-
ing into their homelands.1" In support of this opposition, the Winnebago
even made attacks on the settlements of St. Louis and Chicago.147 How-
ever, by 1825, the tribes began submitting to treaties formally relinquish-
ing their tribal homelands."
In 1832 and 1837, the United States systematically stripped the Winne-
bago Tribe of its territory through two coerced treaties.149 As a result,
the Tribe was forcibly expelled from its ancestral homeland by the United
States government in 1840. This expulsion began the odyssey of five
forced removals to the states of Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and fi-
nally Nebraska-the site of the present-day reservation. s°
B. Public Law 280
In 1952, the Republican Party, led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
won both houses of Congress and the Presidency.151 Upon being sworn
into office in 1953, a hardcore faction of conservative lawmakers, headed
by Congressman E.Y. Berry of South Dakota and Senator Arthur Wat-
kins from Utah, immediately forged legislation designed to terminate the
federal government's supervision of and responsibility for the tribes.152
Congressman Berry and Senator Watkins also pressed lawmakers to
open Indian land and natural resources for development.1 53 Subse-
quently, on January 9, 1953, Congressman William Henry Harrison intro-
duced House Concurrent Resolution 108.11 This resolution announced
Congress' intention to terminate federal supervision over Indian tribes at
the "earliest possible time.' 5 5
146. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 114-47; Sultzman, supra note 123.
147. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 114-47.
148. See generally id. at 118-57; Sultzman, supra note 123 (outlining treaties signed by
the Winnebago).
149. See generally Jones, supra note 115, at 177-99.
150. See PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 196.
151. See VwIE DELORIA, JR., CUSMER DIo FOR YOUR SiNs: AN INDIAN MANIESTO
67 (1972).
152. Id. See D'ARCY McNicKLE, THEY CAME HERE FiRSr THtE EPIC OF TnE AMERI.
CAN INDiAN 264 (1975).
153. DELORiA, JR., supra note 151, at 68. (referring to Congress' exploitation of In-
dian needs to gain termination).
154. Id.
155. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); see DELORIA, JR., supra
note 151, at 68; Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a
2ime Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601, 630-32 (1975).
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Termination was argued on two major grounds. First, termination re-
moved the tribes from the Bureau of Indian Affairs' domination.1 56 Sec-
ond, termination saved the taxpayers money.'57 In reality, Resolution
108 was designed to eradicate Indian communities.' 5 8 By 1968, the fed-
eral government had terminated its relationship with over 100 indigenous
tribes and bands.15 9 Most tribes were small, with enrollments of less than
100 members. 60 However, two tribes stand out: the Menominee of Wis-
consin with 3,270 members and the Klamoth of Oregon with 2,133
members.' 6 '
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) implemented a liquidation policy,
later known as the federal termination policy, which devastated the In-
dian population, lands, culture, economy, and governments.' 62 First, In-
dian lands passed into private ownership. The land could be sold,
mortgaged, and taxed by state and local governments and in many in-
stances, the tribal land was sold and per capita distribution was given to
tribal members.163 Second, civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal terri-
tory was shared with the state."6 Additionally, all services, including ed-
ucation, housing, and welfare, administered by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, were extinguished. 65 Finally, pursuant to the federal termina-
tion policy, all tribal governmental structures were dissolved.' 66 In the
end, more than 100 Indian nations were erased by Congressional Action
between 1953 and 1958.167
156. James E. Officer, Termination as Federal Policy: An Overview, in INDIAN SEL-
RULE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REA.
GAN, 114, 114-24 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986) (noting the termination policy culminated in
House Concurrent Resolution 108).
157. Id
158. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 99 (noting federal services were stopped, reservations
abolished, and tribal assets extinguished).
159. Id. at 102; Robbins, supra note 31, at 99.
160. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 102; see DELORIA, JR., supra note 151, at 60-82.
161. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 102 (stating that of the 1.3 million acres which were
liquidated, the Klamath of Oregon once retained 862,662).
162. Both termination and liquidation are defined as terminating federal tribal legal
relationships. Such a policy stopped federal services and abolished reservations. Interest-
ingly, the term termination replaced the harsher term of liquidation coined by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs in the 1940s due to its derogatory connotation. Id. at 98-123.
163. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 404 (1968) (explain-
ing how the Termination Act provided for the termination of federal supervision of land
and population of the tribe).
164. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
85 (3d ed., The Michie Co. 1991) (1973).
165. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 100-01 (explaining how Congress passed Resolution
108, which ceased all federal services to Indians).
166. Robbins, supra note 31, at 98-99.
167. Id. at 99.
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In conjunction with its termination policy, the federal government insti-
tuted a relocation program, which offered grants, promised jobs, and pro-
vided housing and other opportunities for those who would leave the
reservation and move to designated metropolitan centers."6 Tragically
for most Indians who joined the program, relocation meant temporary
employment in minimum wage dead-end jobs and life in housing projects
and slums.1 6 9
A compromise measure was formulated through the enactment of PL-
280 for Indian tribes who manifested sufficient clout to oppose outright
termination.170 The measure transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction
over reservation Indians to five "mandatory" states: California, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.' 7 ' Similar jurisdiction was of-
fered by PL-280 to all other States, except as specifically exempted. 172
Ironically, the legislation did not require the consent of the tribes even
though the language of PL-280 was a clear infringement on tribal sover-
eignty. 73 As a result of the compromising nature of PL-280, both Indian
tribes and the States were distressed about the enforcement of the pol-
icy's regulations.174 Indian discontent stemmed from the fact that their
consent to PL-280 was not required, a fear of discrimination by both law
enforcement officials and the judiciary, and deprivation of hunting and
fishing rights. 75
168. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 105-07.
169. Id. at 105; see also Robbins, supra note 31 (explaining relocation also meant los-
ing potential leadership).
170. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-
62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 (1953)).
171. Id. Public Law 280 affected the Indian country in California, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. However, there were some exceptions. For instance,
in Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin the Red Lake, Warm Springs, and Menominee Res-
ervations were excluded from the jurisdiction implication respectively. Id.
172. Id. § 1360; see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Woncester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
173. See Ward Churchill & Glenn T. Morris, Key Indian Law and Cases, in THE
STATE OF NATrVE AMERICA: GFNOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RutsrANcis 13,15-16 (M.
Annette Jaimes ed., 1992). See generally Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62,25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22,28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1953)) (describ-
ing applicability to Indian customs and ordinances).
174. NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, BRImFNO Docu~i mr Punuc L\v 280 AND
RETROCESSION AFFECTING THE WINNEBAGO INDIAN RESERVATION 4 (1985) [hereinafter
BRIEFING DocuMENT] (on file with author) (stating the reasons for Indian criticism of PL-
280); see also WUNDER, supra note 36, at 108 (listing the fears of Indians %ith respect to
PL- 280, such as having their treaty protections, favorable Supreme Court holdings, and
fishing and hunting rights taken from them).
175. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 108-09; see BRIEFING DocumIEr, supra note 174, at
4 (stating the reasons for Indian criticism of PL-280); see also WUNDER, supra note 36, at
108 (listing the fears of Indians with respect to PL- 280).
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From its inception, PL-280 was seen by critics as an inappropriate in-
trusion by the United States government into the lives of the Indians. 7 6
Moreover, many states that exercised jurisdiction over Indian country
complained that PL-280 provided no mechanism for Indians to pay for
the law enforcement and court services provided to them."' Under PL-
280, the federal trust responsibility for Indian lands had remained intact,
and thus the States could not tax Indian land. 78
In light of the criticism, Congress amended PL-280 in 1968 to require
consent of Indian tribes for subsequent state assumption of jurisdiction
over Indian lands.' 79 The amendment also enabled states to transfer back
(retrocede) to the federal government all or part of the jurisdiction they
previously assumed pursuant to PL-280."'8
In 1969, the Nebraska Unicameral' adopted Legislative Resolution
37, offering to retrocede almost all aspects of criminal jurisdiction over
the Omaha and Winnebago Indian Reservations. 8 The Omaha Tribe
jumped at the opportunity, but the Winnebago balked,8 3 since its tribal
government had been rendered vestigial by PL-280. With no budget to
pay for law enforcement and court services at the reservation, the Winne-
176. See WUNDER, supra note 36, at 108-09 (recounting the sources of criticism PL-
280 drew prior to its enactment); see also Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1953)).
177. BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 5. According to the Briefing Doci-
ment, the added responsibilities in Indian Country meant local and state governments had
to hire additional police, judges, jail guards, probation, and parole officers, as well as con-
struct new facilities and buy new equipment.
178. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-
62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1953)); see also United States v. Brown, 334 F.
Supp. 536, 538 (D. Neb 1971).
179. Cf Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323); see also BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 4.
180. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat 78 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323); Brown, 334 F. Supp. at 538 (stating that in 1968, Congress allowed the United
States to take back via retrocession from Nebraska any or all measure of state jurisdiction
transferred in 1953); see also BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 3.
181. Leg. Res. 37, 80th Leg., 1st Sess (Neb. 1969); see also Brown, 334 F. Supp. at 544.
182. BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 3; see Omaha Tribe v. Village of Wal-
thill, 460 F.2d 1327, 1328 (8th Cir. 1972) (reiterating that in 1968 the Nebraska Legislature
ceded all criminal jurisdiction except for motor vehicle offenses to the federal govern-
ment); Brown 334 F. Supp. at 538. Inexplicably, the State retrocession completely ignored
the jurisdiction over the Santee Sioux Indian Reservation. Id. The Santee Sioux Reserva-
tion is the only other Indian Reservation in Nebraska. Id. All three reservations are under
the supervision of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. See id.
183. BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 3 (stating the Winnebago Tribal council
was not prepared "to accept the responsibilities attendant with retrocession, [and] adopted
a resolution opposing it").
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bago opposed retrocession1 84 On April 11, 1969, fearing total with-
drawal of state and local police services on the reservation, the
Winnebago Tribal Council adopted a resolution opposing retrocession.ls"
Subsequently, the Secretary of Interior limited acceptance of retrocession
to the Omaha Indian Reservation.18 6
The Winnebago then made vigorous efforts to rebuild its institutions of
government in order to ready themselves for the eventual retrocession."s
In 1975, the Tribe unsuccessfully petitioned the Nebraska Unicameral for
retrocession of civil and criminal jurisdiction.an Non-Indians who owned
and operated businesses and farms on the reservation lobbied against ret-
rocession."' 9 Responding to the concerns of non-Indians, the Judiciary
Committee for the Nebraska Unicameral postponed consideration of the
Winnebago Tribe's retrocession resolution, effectively killing it.
Despite this opposition, the Winnebago continued to take steps to
show the unfairness of non-Indian jurisdiction over them, never surren-
dering the fight for retrocession. On June 8, 1984, the Nebraska Indian
Commission conducted public hearings on issues affecting the American
Indian population in Thurston County.190 At these hearings, problems of
law enforcement with Thurston County officials regarding the Winnebago
Indian Reservation were identified. Evidence adduced at the hearings
indicated the Winnebago were disproportionately impacted by the
county's criminal justice system.19'
As the result of the hearings the Nebraska Indian Commission re-
ported four main findings.' 92 They discovered that there was "a lack of
184. Id.
185. I.
186. Brown, 334 F. Supp. at 538; see also Notice of Acceptance of Retrocession of
Jurisdiction, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,598 (Oct. 25, 1970).
187. BRIEFING Docu,%mr', supra note 174, at 4.
188. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 131 (citing Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The
Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Idians, 22 UCLA L REv. 535,559-60 (1975);
see also BRInEFNG DocuMENT, supra note 174, at 4.
189. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 176.
190. BRIEFING DocuMENT, supra note 174, at 27. The hearings in 1984 concerned
unfairness in criminal arrests against Winnebago. See id. It discussed the number of In-
dian incarcerations, alcohol related offenses and warrants issued.
191. Id. The issues discussed at the hearings included an overview of arrest records in
1983. Looking specifically at 1983, the following statistics describe the difference between
Indian and non-Indian arrest records: between 60-65% of the Indians arrested were
charged with alcohol-related offenses, compared with 21% for non-Indians; 62% of Indian
arrests may have been accomplished without an arrest warrant, compared with only 47.8%
for non-Indians; 80% of Indians were held for pretrial reasons, compared with 64% of non-
Indians; Indians also completed their sentences in greater percentages than non-Indians.
See ki. at 28-29.
192. See id. at 29.
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understanding and communication between tribal and county offi-
cials."' 93 In addition, the Commission reported that the county had
"failed to recognize, appreciate or provide for the cultural and rehabilita-
tive needs" of Winnebago arrestees. 94 Further, the Commission stated
that "the lack of cooperation and mutual working relationships, coupled
with inadequate funding and accountability" had led to Indian percep-
tions of disparate and retaliatory treatment" and to "inadequate and be-
low standard services and facilities."' 95 Finally the commission decided
that there was a mutual reluctance by both county and tribal officials to
recognize the validity of each other's law enforcement.' 96
As a result of the hearings, the Commission made several recommen-
dations. By far, the two most important recommendations were retroces-
sion of the Winnebago Indian Reservation and the establishment of
agreements between the state and the Tribe. Both of these recommenda-
tions were seen as necessary and viable solutions to the problems
identified.' 97
Upon conclusion of the hearings, the Winnebago Tribe made prepara-
tions for retrocession and the introduction of a resolution in the Nebraska
Unicameral.' 98 By January 1985, the Tribe had completed its tribal plan
for retrocession.1 99 On February 23, 1985, the Tribe adopted its own res-
olution calling for the retrocession of criminal and civil jurisdictions."'
Two days later, the Tribe announced its intention to seek retrocession at
an open meeting held with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, agency officials,
the Omaha Tribe, the Thurston County Board of Supervisors, the Thur-
ston County Sheriff, the Thurston County Attorney, and State of Ne-
braska officials.20' At this meeting, the Tribe announced its intention to
seek retrocession. °2 On February 28, 1985, Senator Pappas introduced






198. See id. Tab A, 2.
199. See BRIEmNG DOCUMENT, supra note 174, Tab A, 30-33.
200. Res. No. 85-31, Winnebago Tribal Council (1985) (petitioning the State of Ne-
braska for retrocession of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction), reprinted in BRIEFING Docu-
MENT, supra note 174, App. D; see Charles F. Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees When
Indian Tribes Act as Major Societies: The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CRnnoii.
TON L. REv. 773, 793 n.137 (1988).
201. See Bimmnpw DOCUMENT, supra note 174, Tab A; see also Wilkinson, supra note
200, at 793 n.136.
202. See BYUEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 174, Tab A. See generally Wilkinson, supra
note 200, at 792-94 (discussing the retrocession campaign).
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criminal jurisdiction over the Winnebago Indian Reservation. 03 This
burdensome legislative battle, filled with vitriolic debates and cluttered
with issues outside the scope of PL-280, finally reached its pinnacle with
the passage of Legislative Resolution 57 on January 16, 1986.20 Its pas-
sage ended the criminal jurisdiction of Thurston County courts over the
Tribe.20 5
C. The Politics of the Retrocession Campaign
Indians faced fierce opposition to retrocession from non-Indians. Spe-
cifically, non-Indians owned 80% of the land within the original treaty
boundaries of the reservation. They feared the Indians would use their
power to tax and condemn property and crush the non-Indian landown-
ers and businesses on the reservation.' Non-Indians who opposed ret-
rocession were able to obtain support from the County Board of
Supervisors and the County Sheriff. By virtue of their 4-1 advantage in
population, non-Indians had a greater amount of influence with their
state senator.207 Another advantage the non-Indians had over the Indi-
ans was the fact that the Unicameral had no Indian legislators. In fact,
there was only one minority state senator in the Nebraska Unicameral, an
African American from Omaha.2 8
In response to non-Indian arguments that the Tribe was not competent
to assume jurisdiction over the reservation, the Tribe put forth a list of
accomplishments that had been achieved since the federal termination
policy, PL-280, had been amended.20 9 Their accomplishments covered
the areas of education, law, government, economic development, and so-
cial services.
The first accomplishment was the increase in the level of qualifications
held by tribal officials. During the 1960s, a Tribal Council members' aver-
age age was sixty-five years, while their average formal educational level
was limited to eight years of schooling.2 10 By 1985, the average age of a
Tribal Council member was forty-eight years, and the average educa-
203. Leg. Res. 57, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb 1986); see BrumnFIN Docmt%'r, supra
note 174, Tab A.
204. See Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 794. The resolution barely passed with a 25-21
vote. See id.
205. See i. at 794. Federal and Tribal courts now had criminal jurisdiction. See id.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. Senator Ernie Chambers represented District 11 in Omaha. He was an ardent
advocate of minority rights and a true friend to the Indians.




tional level was fourteen years.21' One member of the Council had a
master's degree, two had bachelor's degrees, and several others had two
to three years of college. The attainment of higher education levels and
the increase in the tribal budget demonstrate the considerable advance-
ment of the Winnebago Tribe. After the amendment to the federal termi-
nation policy, the Tribe created a strong tribal government. It also built a
number of enterprises on the reservation. The annual tribal budget grew
from a mere $6,000 in the 1960s to $2.7 million in 1985.212
Further development is shown in other areas of the reservation that
demonstrate the capacity of the Winnebago Tribal Government. By 1985,
twelve tribal members had been certified as qualified police officers by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and/or the Nebraska State Police Acad-
emy.213 The Chief Judge of the Winnebago Tribal Children's Court, an
enrolled214 member of the Tribe, had a law degree from the University of
Nebraska.2"5 In addition, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, the Tribe reassumed jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and
heard nearly 300 cases.2" 6 To address health and infrastructure needs, the
Tribe promulgated codes in child welfare, fish and game, natural re-
sources, and hazardous waste or disposal areas. The Tribe also developed
codes for building, environment, taxation, and criminal and civil matters.
Tribal social service programs also operated in the areas of substance
abuse and child welfare.2" 7 Rehabilitation and related counseling ser-
vices were enacted for those dependent on drugs,21 8 and foster care and
group homes were made available for needy children. Additionally, the
Tribe had an emergency medical team, a tribal health department, a com-
211. Id
212. Id at 32-33. Economic development by the Tribe included a beef, hog, and row.
cropping operation, an auto-truck service center, a grocery store and cafd, a bingo opera-
tion, and an aero-space manufacturing division.
213. Id. at 31.
214. In many instances, tribal enrollment is necessary to access political and social
associations, education in Indian schools, religious activities, and property rights. See CUN.
TON ET AL., supra note 164, at 85. Currently there are 3,928 enrolled members of The
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska. See The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, The Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska, at http://www.winnebagotribe.conwinnebago_tribe...oLnebraska.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
215. BRIEFno DOCUMENT, supra note 174, at 31.
216. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978). Congress took control of the
regulation of Indian affairs in 1978 by the passage of this Act, but its purpose was to give
Indian tribes more control and take power away from the states that were administering it
unfairly. Section 4 of this Act stated the unnecessary break-up of Indian families by non-
tribal agencies. Section 5 suggests the states have failed to recognize the social and cultural
relations of Indian rule.




munity college, pre-school and other adult level educational programs,
and employment assistance services.21
Obviously, the advances made by the Tribe were equal to, if not better
than, those of any other town of its size in America. Thus it was para-
mount that the Winnebago achieved their ultimate goal of retrocession
and control over their own people-a people victimized, abused, and de-
prived of all of their lands and past heritage. Only a victory in the Ne-
braska Legislature could end this constant suffering and the fight would
not be easy.
On January 16, 1986, the Senate debated Legislative Resolution 57 on
the Nebraska Unicameral floor.22 During the debate, Winnebago men,
women, and children filled the north gallery of the Senate Chamber,
watching as the senators debated and voted on their request for retroces-
sion. They heard one senator speak with disgust about life on Indian res-
ervations.? 1 Another wondered out loud whether Indians were
competent to administer their own laws.m One senator even attempted
to link Indians with organized crime and gambling a3 They watched as
senators read racist handouts describing the Indian "problem" and the
Indian "situation." 4
Senator Pappas argued that gambling was not the issue, but instead
stressed that the focus should be on what is right and fair for the Winne-
bago.' Noting that the Winnebago had promised in writing to fairly and
justly administer the law, Pappas thought it was hypocritical to question
the Tribe's promise in view of the history between non-Indians and Indi-
ans." 6 It was not the Indians who have historically broken treaties he
argued, it was the white man who had been breaking treaties since the
beginning of time.' 7
When the heated debates came to an end, the resolution was moved
and a roll call vote was requested, which passed by a vote of 25 to 21.11
219. Id.
220. Leg. Res. 57, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb 1986).
221. See generally id.
222. See generally id.
223. Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 793 n.136.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 792-93 (stating that various arguments were made against retrocession).
226. Id. at 793 n.137.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 794 (saying that the vote was the best possible majority, because 25 of 49
Nebraska Senators were required for victory); see also Tribe Celebrates Legislative Win:
Non-Indians Feel Disenfranchised, OMAHA WoRiD HERAD, Jan. 17, 1986, at 1.
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This vote represents a historic victory that ended forty years of political
strife revolving around the initiation of the federal termination policy.
229
Outside the Senate Chamber in the Capitol Rotunda, several Winne-
bago gathered to thank the senators who voted for retrocession. Neola
Walker, a proud and feisty grandmother and a long-time member of the
Tribal Council, said retrocession meant the end to the Tribe's prolonged
battle with the County Sheriff. Walker strongly asserted that the Winne-
bago tried to make changes peacefully. But when push came to shove the
Tribe had to take the Sheriff to court. Now she said, "the Sheriff just
needs to get off the reservation.""2 Tribal member Donna Vandall com-
mented that senators who criticized the Indian way expressed ignorance
and fear rather than bigotry. 31 "People who debated against it are fear-
ful," she said. "They don't know us. There's a lot of fear of people who
don't know us. We belong together," she wept. "We choose to live to-
gether. We're a people." 23
2
D. The Impact of Retrocession on Jurisdiction
1. Retrocession of Criminal Jurisdiction 3
The retrocession process was rife with statist paternalistic bias. The
following is an analysis of the federal statutes that substantially affected
criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations, even after retrocession of
criminal jurisdiction occurred. These statutes included: 1) The General
Crimes Act; 4 2) The Assimilative Crimes Act;235 3) The Major Crimes
Act; 6 and 4) The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.3
The General Crimes Act extended general criminal laws of the United
States to Indian reservations, thereby placing all major interracial crimes
229. Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 794; see also Tribe Celebrates Legislative Win: Non-
Indians Feel Disenfranchised, supra note 228.
230. Gabriela Stern, Senators Give Winnebagos Jurisdiction, OMAH1A WORLD Hen-
ALD, Jan. 17, 1986, at 1; Tribe Celebrates Legislative Win: Non-Indians Feel Disen-
franchised, supra note 228.
231. Stem, supra note 230; Tribe Celebrates Legislative Win: Non-Indians Feel Disen-
franchised, supra note 228, at 2.
232. Stem, supra note 230; Tribe Celebrates Legislative Win: Non-Indians Feel Disen-
franchised, supra note 228, at 2.
233. See generally BRIEFING DocumiNrT, supra note 174, at 8-10 (listing federal
statutes limiting the criminal jurisdiction of Tribal courts); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARMz L. Rv.
503, 520-52 (1976) (discussing federal statutes restricting the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts).
234. The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
235. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
236. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)
237. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1968).
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under the jurisdiction of federal courts.3 8 However, criminal jurisdiction
was not extended to offenses committed by one Indian against another
Indian.23 9
The Assimilative Crimes Act permitted the federal government to ap-
ply or assimilate minor state criminal laws to offenses committed on a
reservation. This allowed for the assumption of jurisdiction over such of-
fenses that had not been specifically prohibited by federal or tribal law.
The Act permitted the federal government to apply (assimilate) minor
state criminal laws. This allowed the Tribe to obtain jurisdiction over in-
terracial crimes committed on a reservation.
The Major Crimes Act enumerates fourteen crimes that if committed
by an Indian on Indian land would result in federal jurisdiction. The
crimes include, but are not limited to "murder manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, incest, assault with an attempt to commit murder, assault with a
dangerous weapon ... arson, burglary [and] robbery."' 40
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 limited tribal courts to the imposi-
tion of misdemeanor sentences resulting in a $500 fine, six months in jail,
or both.24' It also provided for the right to invoke and retain counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.242 This represents the largest area of criminal juris-
diction the Tribe was hoping to acquire through retrocession. Previous to
the act being passed, the Tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over incidents
that took place on their land.243 By not having jurisdiction over their
land, Indians were prevented by a paternalistic government from exercis-
ing their self-determination rights. 2"
238. The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994)
239. See i
240. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). In pertinent part the act states:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kid-
napping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to com-
mit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury... an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the
Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, wvith the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
Id.
241. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1968).
242. Id
243. Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 791.
244. Id. (stating, however, that the Tribe reluctantly admitted it was not prepared to
accept responsibilities of retrocession).
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The Winnebago assumption of jurisdiction in 1985 gave the tribal court
jurisdiction involving most non-major crimes.245 For example, where a
crime is perpetrated by an Indian against another Indian, tribal courts
have absolute jurisdiction unless it is one of fourteen major crimes as
provided for in the Major Crimes Act,24 6 in which case the federal courts
would have jurisdiction. Alternately, where a non-major crime is com-
mitted by an Indian against a non-Indian, federal prosecutors apply state
laws in federal courts under the Assimilative Crimes Act.247 In those sit-
uations, the tribal court still retains concurrent jurisdiction over misde-
meanor crimes.248 A crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian
falls within federal jurisdiction.249
The Winnebago Tribe identified several areas of concern wherein coop-
eration between state and tribal authorities would be needed. Those ar-
eas include cross deputization, fresh pursuit, and extradition .250 Since the
Winnebago Reservation was configured in such a manner that tribal and
individual trust land alternated with fee simple land, it was not always
clear where Indian jurisdiction would end and where state jurisdiction
would begin.25 Cross-deputization represented a solution whereby the
Tribe and state granted each the authority to arrest and detain an of-
fender, whether the offender was Indian or non-Indian.25 2 After arrest,
245. BRIEFING DocuMENT, supra note 174, at 10-11. Under Winnebago assumption
of criminal jurisdiction, the following scenarios were possible:
1. Crime by an Indian Against an Indian.
2. Crime by an Indian Against a Non-Indian.
3. Crime by a Non-Indian Against an Indian
4. Crime by a Non-Indian Against an Indian.
5. "Victimless" or "Consensual" Crimes by an Indian.
6. "Victimless" or "Consensual" Crimes by a Non-Indian.
Id.
246. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); 51 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (1986). The
major crimes are murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female
that is not the offenders wife and who is not 16 years old, assault with intent to commit
rape, incest, murder, assault with a deadly weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily harm,
arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny. See id.
247. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13.
248. BRIEFnmG DocuMENT, supra note 174, at 15-16. See also Wilkinson, supra note
200, at 790. Tribal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction when the parties are Indians. Id. at
790 n.119.
249. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13; The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (1994).
250. Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 793-94.
251. Id. at 790 (explaining how jurisdictional overlap was not alleviated by PL-280);
see also WUNDER, supra note 36, at 1008 (noting state jurisdiction could not conflict with
federal statutes, treaties, or executive agreements, and tribal laws conflicting with state
laws were void).
252. WUNDER, supra note 36, at 108-10.
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the offender would be delivered to the proper authority for prosecution.
But under the "fresh-pursuit" doctrine, the officers of each could pursue
an offender from one jurisdiction to another.2s Once the offender was
arrested, he would be held in the jurisdiction where the arrest was made
and then extradited to the jurisdiction where the crime was committed.2
2. Retrocession of Civil Jurisdiction
In acquiring retrocession of civil jurisdiction, the tribal court estab-
lished exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving Indians. Issues rela-
tive to adoption, child custody, marriage, divorce, contract and tort
actions are resolved in tribal court." 5 In a civil dispute on the reservation
involving an action by a non-Indian against an Indian, the Tribal court
normally has exclusive jurisdiction." 6 Otherwise, if the action arises
outside of "Indian Country," the State court retains jurisdiction3 ' How-
ever, where an Indian files suit against a non-Indian, and the tribe as-
sumes exclusive jurisdiction, the Indian plaintiff is precluded from suing
in state court."' Finally, if a claim arose from a situation on the reserva-
tion between non-Indians, the State court rather than the tribal court as-
sumes jurisdiction. 59
V. CONCLUSION
Since the passage of Legislative Resolution 57 in January 1986, the
Winnebago have embraced the benefits of retrocession.2 " Today, the
positive impact of attaining a semblance of self-government has been re-
flected in the strides and achievements the Winnebago have made.
The Winnebago have established various business enterprises dedi-
cated to increasing their self-sufficiency and encouraging the develop-
ment of the Tribe and its members. 61 For example, in a collateral effort
to preserve the cultural traditions of the Winnebago and simultaneously
bolster the economy, the Tribe is establishing a tourism sector.262 This
253. See id. See also BMF G Docum1Er, supra note 174, at 10-12.
254. BRMEFiG DocuMEr, supra note 174, at 12. Extradition agreements provided
for the return of offenders to the jurisdiction in which a crime was committed.
255. Id at 10.
256. Id. at 15-16.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 16.
259. Id.
260. See Wilkinson, supra note 200, at 794. The resolution barely passed with a 25 to
21 vote. See id.
261. See The Wimnebago Tribe of Nebraska, Enterprise, at httpJ/www.%innebagotribe.




initiative has seen the creation of a Cultural Resource Center, the exten-
sion of an open invitation to the Tribe's annual PowWow, an increase in
ferry service across the Missouri River, and the promotion of the Lewis
and Clarke Trail which passes through the Reservation. 63
Additionally, in 1992, the Tribe opened and began operating the Win-
naVegas Casino, as a result of the passage of the federal Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA). 4  Congress' purpose in enacting
IGRA was "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian Tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency and strong tribal governments." 65 The Winnebago took ad-
vantage of the opportunity IGRA presented and, since its opening, the
WinnaVegas Casino has had a major economic impact providing both in-
creased employment and revenue for the Tribe.2 66
In December 2001, the Winnebago Tribe was recognized for the inno-
vative manner in which it approached the challenges of governing. 67 The
Winnebago's economic development corporation, Ho-Chunk Inc., was
one of five recipients of the Innovations in American Government
Award."' Ho-Chunk, which was founded in 1994 for the purpose of rein-
vesting profits from the gaming industry and diversifying businesses in
the economy, has positively impacted the lives of the Winnebago peo-
ple. 69 In addition to operating the WinnaVegas Casino, it has generated
263. See id.
264. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988); 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
265. See id. § 3(1).
266. See The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, supra note 214.
267. See News Release, Institute for Government Innovation, Winnebago Tribe's Eco-
nomic Development Corporation Wins Prestigious American Government Innovation
Award: Ho-Chunk, Inc. Awarded One of Five $100,000 Prizes (Dec. 13,2001) (announcing
Ho-Chunk, Inc., received the honor in recognition of its successful generation of employ-
ment opportunities and business development), available at http://vww.innovations.
harvard.edu/release/2001/121301-hc.html (on file with author).
268. See id. This award is through a program of the John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment at Harvard University. See id. See also Winnebago Tribe Recognized for Eco-
nomic Success, (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http:/Avww.indianz.com/SmokeSignals/Head
lines/showfull.asp (on file with author). Of the five awards presented the Winnebago were
the only tribal government recognized. Id. The other winners included: "the federal gov-
ernment's Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety; OK First,
the state of Oklahoma's web-based emergency awareness system; California's Mathemat-
ics, Engineering, Science Achievement (MESA) program; and the Toledo Plan to improve
the quality of teaching in Toledo, Ohio." Id.
269. News Release, supra note 267.
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other successful businesses, including hotels, shopping centers, gas sta-
tions and three technology enterprises.27"
The establishment of the gaming industry and its subsequent profits
have allowed the Winnebago to upgrade and implement a number of so-
cial welfare programs to treat, rehabilitate, and educate its people. On
the reservation, self-esteem, often tied to gainful employment, has also
increased dramatically. In the past, the Winnebago struggled against bar-
riers such as low income, high unemployment, and an inability to access
affordable housing. Since Ho-Chunk's founding, however, unemploy-
ment on the reservation has decreased dramatically-from 70% to
20%271 A collateral effect of the casino was a dramatic decrease in
crime. With the opening of the casino and increased job opportunities at
the reservation, Indian arrests at the reservation declined by 75% in the
first 18 months of the casino's operation.
The Winnebago initiative, undertaken through incorporating Ho-
Chunk, has established a model for all Indian Nations to follow, as it
successfully demonstrates how to create infrastructure and institutions
necessary for development?' Clearly, that investment is paying off as
indicated by the fact that in the last ten years the Tribe's discretionary
annual income has increased from a mere $150,000 to $50 millionY 73 Such
a measure of achievement is indicative of the positive reinforcement that
occurred when retrocession returned to the Tribe the ability to reassert
their sovereignty through tribal self-determination.
Although the Tribe may never attain the prestige and glory that it had
prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America, the achievements of
the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska are models for all Indian peoples. The
measure of sovereignty that Indian tribes exercise will not only ensure
their continued economic development and cultural growth but also pro-
vide for a greater contribution to society as a whole. The time has come
for all Indian peoples to emerge, as the Winnebago has done, like a great
phoenix to claim their share of the American Dream.
270. Id In order to be successful, tribal governments must generate revenue through
the development of businesses because they are prevented from establishing a stable tax
base.
271. Id.
272. Many tribes are following the successful Ho-Chunk example and replicating the
system. Id.
273. See id.
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